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images, demonstrating that the 
effect is not driven by incidental 
stimulus-related characteristics. 
Further, threatening — but not 
non-threatening — stimuli were 
judged as arriving earlier than 
scrambled versions of the same 
images, suggesting that the effect is 
driven specifically by responses to 
threatening stimuli.
Experiment 3 investigated whether 
reduced time-to-collision judgments 
could reflect a non-specific effect of 
seeing threatening stimuli, such as 
heightened arousal. Participants saw 
threatening or non-threatening stimuli 
for one second, immediately followed 
by a looming blue disc. If the effect 
we report is a non-specific effect of 
seeing threatening stimuli, time-to-
collision judgments of the blue disc 
should be faster when preceded 
by images of threatening stimuli. 
Contrary to this prediction, priming 
images had no apparent effect on 
time-to-collision judgments of a 
semantically-neutral disc. 
Threatening stimuli are perceived 
as approaching more rapidly than 
non-threatening stimuli, especially 
for those who are fearful of those 
objects. These results show, in 
contrast to the traditional view of 
looming as a purely optical cue to 
object approach [1], that perceiving 
the time of imminent collision is 
not entirely driven by purely optical 
cues, but is also subject to emotional 
modulation. Gibson and colleagues 
[1] pointed out that as an optical cue 
to imminent collision, visual looming is 
a direct perceptual indicator of threat. 
Our results suggest that the affective 
content of looming stimuli also 
affects perceived time-to-collision. 
Underestimating arrival time of 
threatening stimuli may thus serve an 
adaptive role in leading responses to 
err on the side of additional time for 
either fight or flight. Some perceptual 
biases appear only for explicit 
perceptual judgments, but not for 
visually-guided actions [5]. Thus, it 
is possible that the present effect 
reflects a purely perceptual distortion 
that might not affect actions, such as 
catching.
Recent findings have demonstrated 
that emotion modulates some basic 
aspects of perception, such as visual 
contrast sensitivity [6], but not others, 
such as auditory directional attention 
[7]. The selectivity of emotional 
effects on perception is consistent 
with anecdotal reports that specific 
phobias may induce category-
specific distortions of perception [8]. 
Though we investigated variability 
in fear in an unselected sample (i.e. 
generally non-phobic), our results 
provide experimental evidence 
consistent with this proposal. Other 
recent results have also suggested 
that individual differences in fear, 
even in the non-clinical range, alter 
space perception. For example, 
fear of heights is associated with 
distorted perception of vertical 
distance [9], whereas claustrophobic 
fear is associated with increased 
size of the near space immediately 
surrounding the body [10]. The 
present results fit with and extend 
these by showing that emotion not 
only alters the perception of space 
as a static entity, but it also affects 
the perception of dynamically moving 
objects, such as those on a collision 
course with the observer.  
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Groups have a 
larger cognitive 
capacity than 
individuals
Takao Sasaki and Stephen C. PrattIncreasing the number of options 
can paradoxically lead to worse 
decisions, a phenomenon known as 
cognitive overload [1]. This happens 
when an individual decision-maker 
attempts to digest information 
exceeding its processing capacity. 
Highly integrated groups, such 
as social insect colonies, make 
consensus decisions that combine 
the efforts of many members, 
suggesting that these groups can 
overcome individual limitations [2–4]. 
Here we report that an ant colony 
choosing a new nest site is less 
vulnerable to cognitive overload 
than an isolated ant making this 
decision on her own. We traced 
this improvement to differences 
in individual behavior. In whole 
colonies, each ant assesses only a 
small subset of available sites, and 
the colony combines their efforts to 
thoroughly explore all options. An 
isolated ant, on the other hand, must 
personally assess a larger number 
of sites to approach the same level 
of option coverage. By sharing the 
burden of assessment, the colony 
avoids overtaxing the abilities of its 
members.
Nest site selection by Temnothorax 
ants exemplifies collective decision-
making without well-informed leaders 
[5]. When a colony must find a new 
home, it can choose the better of two 
new sites even when no single ant 
assesses both. Instead, comparison 
emerges from a competition between 
recruitment efforts. Upon finding a 
site, an ant recruits nestmates to it 
with a probability that depends on 
the site’s quality, as determined by 
entrance diameter, cavity size, light 
level, and other features [6]. Her 
recruits make their own quality-
dependent recruitment decisions, 
creating positive feedback that 
directs the colony towards the 
better nest. Consensus is further 
enhanced by a quorum rule that 
accelerates recruitment once a 
site’s population has surpassed a 
threshold [5]. 
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require individuals to compare 
sites, they have the ability to do 
so; an isolated ant that assesses 
two sites of different quality can 
reliably choose the better one [7]. 
We took advantage of this fact to 
compare the cognitive capacity of 
groups and individuals. We induced 
subjects (either whole colonies 
or isolated ants of T. rugatulus) to 
select a new nest in one of two 
conditions. In the simpler condition 
they chose between only two nests, 
one good and one poor. In the more 
challenging condition, they chose 
among eight options, four good and 
four poor (Figure 1A). Good nests 
differed only in having a smaller 
entrance, a strongly favored feature 
[6]. Decision performance was 
measured by noting which type of 
nest the subject moved into. 
We found that individuals 
performed significantly worse when 
the number of options was eight 
rather than two, indicating that they 
experienced cognitive overload 
(χ2 = 4.18, N = 43, df = 1, p < 0.05). 
In the two-nest condition, over 80% A
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performance. Colonies, on the other 
hand, performed equally well with 
either two or eight options, with at 
least 90% choosing a good nest in 
each condition (χ2 = 0.36, N = 40, 
df = 1, p = 0.55) (Figure 1B). Thus, 
colonies achieved a significantly 
higher decision performance in the 
face of increased processing load 
than did individuals (partial χ2 test:  
χ2 = 8.75, N = 3, df = 3, p = 0.03). 
We hypothesized that colonies 
better handle higher option numbers 
because their members do not have 
to assess as many sites as isolated 
individuals. If so, we predicted that 
each colony member visits a smaller 
number of nests than an isolated 
ant. To test this, we repeated the 
eight-nest treatment, but counted 
the number of sites visited by each 
ant. The results of this second 
experiment confirmed our prediction: 
isolated ants assessed significantly 
more sites than did colony members 
(Wilcoxon rank test: W = 1819, 
Nisolated = 10, Ncolony = 209, B
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nies or isolated ants) were made to abandon 
m an array of either two or eight good (G) and 
oosing good or poor nests in each treatment. 
 options than with two (top chart), but colonies 
f the number of options (bottom chart). (C) In 
ore nests than did individual colony members. 
izontal line indicates the median, and whiskers p < 0.01) (Figure 1C). Importantly, 
although each colony member visited 
very few sites, the colony collectively 
assessed all eight sites.
The inferior performance of 
isolated ants cannot be explained 
as a simple artifact of isolating 
these normally very social animals. 
Lone ants performed just as well as 
colonies when choosing between 
two sites; only with an increase in 
option number did their ability to 
select a good nest decline (Figure 
1B). Nor can the colony advantage 
be ascribed to a higher probability 
of finding a good site. Because half 
of the options were good in both 
conditions, the probability of finding 
a good nest did not depend on the 
number of options available for 
either colonies or individuals (see 
the Supplemental Information for 
details). Furthermore, when isolated 
ants were tracked in the second 
experiment, all of them found at 
least one good nest. Indeed, they 
found many more sites than did all 
but a few individual colony members 
(Figure 1C). The small minority 
of colony members that visited a 
large number of nests contributed 
little to total transport effort, and 
thus to the colony’s decision (see 
the Supplemental Information for 
details). Therefore, we attribute 
the worse performance of isolated 
ants to the difficulty of processing 
a greater load of data. We cannot 
say why isolated ants do not avoid 
this problem by simply assessing 
fewer sites. However, we speculate 
that they prolong their search 
for new nests because they lack 
social interactions, such as quorum 
attainment, that would normally 
trigger earlier acceptance of a site.
Cognitive overload is a growing 
issue for human decision-making, 
as unprecedented access to data 
poses new challenges to individual 
processing abilities [1]. Human 
groups also solve difficult problems 
better when each group member has 
only limited access to information [8]. 
For social insects, this advantage is 
likely much greater, because natural 
selection on colony-level phenotypes 
has shaped particularly elaborate 
and highly integrated group 
cognition. This is because selection 
acts largely through the reproductive 
success of whole colonies, rather 
than that of the sterile workers that 
make them up [9].
Magazine
R829
 
aluminum sulfate (Alum) — were 
evaluated by volunteers for perceived 
astringency intensity over the 
course of 80 oral exposures (sips). 
The astringency intensity curves 
grew exponentially over exposures, 
regardless of the compound or 
concentration (Figure 1A and Figure 
S1 in the Supplemental Information). 
Each astringent solution, however, 
elicited distinct maxima (a + y0) 
depending on the concentration level. 
Weakly concentrated solutions never 
reached the astringency maxima of 
more concentrated solutions of the 
same compound. In addition, the rate 
(b) at which maximal intensity was 
reached over trials varied with both the 
chemical structure and concentration 
(Figure 1B). Here, Alum and EGCG 
solutions reach their astringency 
maxima faster at high concentrations 
than low, whereas GSE solutions 
reach their maximum at the same rate 
regardless of the concentration.
After establishing that weak 
astringents could elicit strong 
astringency with repeated sampling, 
we asked subjects to rate fattiness 
and astringency, after ingesting pieces 
of fatty food (dried meat) alternating 
with multiple sips of one of two rinsing 
solutions (tea or water). Astringent 
rinses affected oral sensations. In 
particular, the perceived fattiness 
was less pronounced after drinking 
tea than after drinking water (Figure 
1C left panel). Thus, astringent 
consumption during meals provided 
a greater reduction of oral fattiness 
compared to water rinses. We also 
observed a more significant growth 
of astringency sensation with 
multiple sips without eating a fatty 
food, indicating that fat reduced the 
build-up of astringency (Figure 1C 
right panel). Similarly, there was a 
greater increase of fatty sensation 
from repeated fatty food consumption 
without any rinsing (Figure 1D left 
panel). These observations support 
the hypothesis that these sensations 
oppose each other perceptually 
and lie at different ends of an oral 
rheological/tribological sensory 
spectrum.
The oral perceptions of fattiness 
and astringency largely depend 
on tactile sensations [7]. Frictional 
rubbing of the oral epithelia is very 
important for food tactile perception. 
For example, foods are commonly 
assessed mechanically ex vivo using 
a tribometer, which measures the 
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In most cultures, people ingest 
a variety of astringent foods and 
beverages during meals, but the 
reasons for this practice are unclear. 
Many popular beliefs and heuristics, 
such as high tannin wines should 
be balanced with fatty foods, for 
example ‘red wine with red meat’, 
suggest that astringents such as 
pickles, sorbets, wines, and teas 
‘cleanse’ the palate while eating. 
Oral astringents elicit ‘dry, rough’ 
sensations [1], in part, by breaking 
down mucinous lubricating proteins 
in saliva [2,3]. The introduction 
of oral lubricants, including fats, 
partially diminishes strong astringent 
sensations [4,5]. Thus, it appears 
that astringency and fattiness can 
oppose each other perceptually on 
an oral rheological spectrum. Most 
teas, wines, and ‘palate cleansers’, 
however, are only mildly astringent 
and an explanation of how they could 
oppose the fattiness of meals is 
lacking. Here, we demonstrate that 
weakly astringent stimuli can elicit 
strong sensations after repeated 
sampling. Astringency builds with 
exposures [6] to an asymptotic level 
determined by the structure and 
concentration of the compound. We 
also establish that multiple sips of 
a mild astringent solution, similar 
to a wine or tea, decrease oral fat 
sensations elicited by fatty food 
consumption when astringent and 
fatty stimuli alternate, mimicking 
the patterning that occurs during a 
real meal. Consequently, we reveal a 
principle underlying the international 
practice of ‘palate cleansing’. 
Repeatedly alternating samples 
of astringent beverages with fatty 
foods yielded ratings of fattiness 
and astringency that were lower than 
if rinsing with water or if presented 
alone without alternation. 
Three astringents — grape seed 
extract (GSE), epigallocatechin-
gallate (EGCG) from green tea, and It has long been recognized 
that collective choice can improve 
accuracy by averaging out 
the random errors of inaccurate 
individual decisions [3]. The 
advantage we find here is different: 
rather than combining many 
essentially identical choices, 
colonies truly distribute their 
decision-making. No worker 
must carry out the full task of 
assessing and comparing all options, 
allowing the colony as a whole to 
process more information, more 
effectively. This advantage can 
serve as a model for the rapidly 
developing field of collective 
robotics, which looks to the robust, 
decentralized group behavior of 
social animals for biologically 
inspired design ideas [10].
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